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The Spin-off of Sonae Capital 
 
Abstract 
 The purpose of this project is to study the spin-off of Sonae Capital, which took 
place in January 2008. Taking the form of a case study, this project is divided between 
the case narrative and a teaching note. I study the background and motivation of the 
transaction, along with its outcome. With the available information at the time of the 
case, I value Sonae Capital at the date of the spin-off and describe a possible trading 
strategy involving both the spun-off and the demerged companies. Finally, I conclude 
that the transaction was more beneficial for the parent company, Sonae SGPS, and that 
it did not follow the typical outperformance pattern observed in other spin-offs. 
 










The Spin-off of Sonae Capital 
 
 "In the context of the continuing restructuring of the Sonae Group, we intend to 
provide Sonae Capital with adequate human, financial and management resources to 
permit its spin-off from Sonae SGPS in the near future. Following this spin-off, Sonae 
SGPS will be much more focussed on businesses which will be, directly or indirectly, 
closer to final consumers."i 
 — Belmiro de Azevedo, Chairman, Sonae SGPS, on March 20th, 2007 
  
 In the opening message of the Report and Accounts 2006, Belmiro de Azevedo, 
the charismatic leader of Sonae SGPS, a Portuguese commercial and industrial 
conglomerate, announced the spin-off of Sonae Capital. This subsidiary of the Sonae 
Group managed a business portfolio with holdings across disperse sectors, such as, real 
estate, tourism, energy or venture capital. In the months that followed, the transaction 
would be prepared and the business structure of the new company to emerge from it 
would undergo a profound reorganization. Now, just before the listing of Sonae Capital, 
Steven Daniels, a trader for Solid Investment Bank, has to assess the possible trading 
opportunities arising from the spin-off, taking into account that this sort of divestiture 
usually provides a good source of return. Could there be some hidden value in Sonae 
Capital to be unlocked by this transaction?1 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Although the character and the Investment Bank are fictitious, the case is based on a real-life transaction 
and Sonae SGPS, along with all other related companies, are real. 
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History of Sonaeii 
 Sonae, Sociedade Nacional de Estratificados, dates back to 1959 when it began 
its operation as a producer of decorative wood laminates. Founded by Afonso Pinto de 
Magalhães, an Oporto banker and businessman, Sonae would turn out to be one of the 
most important companies in the Portuguese enterprise scene thanks to Belmiro de 
Azevedo, who joined in 1965. 
 From humble beginnings, Belmiro de Azevedo managed to get a university 
degree at a time when studying was not accessible to many. This self-made man entered 
Sonae as a chemical engineer for an R&D position, but quickly progressed and assumed 
a higher role in the company. During the troubled times after the Carnation Revolution 
of 1974, with the owners of the company fleeing the country and Sonae in the verge of 
being nationalized, Belmiro de Azevedo managed to gather the support of the workers 
around the management, of which by then he was part of. The stance of the workers, 
going on strike in support of the prevailing management and against the interference of 
the state, was contrary to what was happening all around the country and turned out to 
be decisive for Sonae to avoid nationalization. Along with the importance of his role in 
the management of Sonae, Belmiro de Azevedo also became one of the main 
shareholders at this stage. 
 In the 1970s, Sonae started to diversify its businesses, with the acquisition of a 
particleboard factory and the entrance in the chemical industry. During the following 
decade, the company further diversified into tourism, insurance, media, construction or 
real estate. However, probably the most visible segment of the group was that of retail 
and distribution, with the opening of the first hypermarket in Portugal in 1985.  
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 In 1983, Sonae was launched in the Portuguese stock exchange with a market 
capitalization equivalent to about €2.5 million. The year of 1987 was also a particularly 
interesting one in the history of the group, with the carve-outs of seven of its 
subsidiaries. In a controversial move, exploiting the tax benefits for companies going 
public, Sonae was able to raise €20 million.iii Taking advantage of the stock market to 
finance its growth has been a part of Sonae's DNA for long and this episode was just the 
most noticeable evidence of that. 
 The 1990s saw Sonae open the first modern shopping centre in Portugal, 
CascaiShopping. This would become a strategic area for the group, which continued to 
develop similar projects throughout the country and abroad. In 1998, Sonae entered the 
telecommunications business with the launch of Optimus, the third mobile 
communications operator in Portugal. In 1999, it would be incorporated in Sonaecom, 
the sub-holding for media and telecommunications, along with, for example, Público, a 
daily newspaper. One year later, Sonaecom would be listed in the Portuguese stock 
exchange. Before the turn of the century, Sonae also took control of bankrupt Torralta 
and its real estate development in the Tróia peninsula, with the intention to invest in the 
area.iv 
 In the year of 2005, Sonae decided to spin-off Sonae Indústria, a subsidiary in 
the wood-based products business. The transaction aimed to give autonomy to an 
already publicly listed company, increasing its free float, and, in a sense, getting rid of 
the "troubled son" of the group. Sonae Indústria, a reminder of the initial activity of 
Sonae and Belmiro de Azevedo's background, was in a very cyclical business and one 
greatly exposed to the construction sector. What is more, the wood-based products 
business was not included in the core areas of the group, nor was it correlated with 
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them. Accordingly, the spin-off aimed to create value from the increased focus of Sonae 
and the reduction of the conglomerate discount at which the group traded. During the 
year of 2006, both Sonae and Sonae Indústria had stock market performances similar to 
the Portuguese stock market index, PSI-20.  
 In 2006, Sonae launched a tender offer for the much larger Portugal Telecom, 
the major telecommunications operator in the Portuguese market. The offer was 
considered unsolicited and therefore hostile by the target's board. The takeover battle 
dragged on for more than a year and ended in defeat for Sonae, with Belmiro de 
Azevedo accusing the Portuguese government of interference.v Even though Sonae did 
not manage to succeed, the telecommunications market in Portugal changed, with the 
obligation of PT to separate the wholesale from the retail business, destroying the 
monopolistic position of the company across the market.vi 
 Soon after the failure of the takeover battle, Sonae announced a change in its 
management structure. Belmiro de Azevedo retired as CEO, leaving the job for his son, 
Paulo Azevedo, but remaining as Chairman. The latter was considered to be the 
mastermind behind the tender offer and had gained credit in the market from its 
leadership of Sonaecom. Overall the market reaction was positive.vii 
 At this moment, in 2008, Sonae is a holding company whose stated mission is to 
"control and actively manage a portfolio of companies."viii The portfolio is composed by 
Sonae Distribuição (food and non food retail), Sonae Sierra (shopping centres), 
Sonaecom (telecommunications) and Sonae Capital (services), each run on an 
independent manner. The company has a strong international presence, especially in the 
areas of retail and shopping centres. The group also highlights the above average 
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shareholder returns in the last twenty years, considering its condition of holding to be a 
value enhancer.ix  
   
Spin-offs and Conglomerate Discounts 
 A spin-off is a form of divestiture by which a parent company creates a new 
legal entity out of a subsidiary, by issuing and distributing shares of that new company 
to its own shareholders, on a pro rata basis. The new company will, thus, become 
autonomous and have its own management team, whilst this proportional distribution of 
shares initially leaves both companies with the same stockholder base.  
 Although this type of divestiture does not generate a cash infusion to the parent 
company, there are several motivations to undertake it, particularly to eliminate, or at 
least reduce, the commonly designated conglomerate discount. A conglomerate discount 
"is said to apply to businesses that refuse to stick to one industry, leading to valuations 
considerably lower than the sum of their parts."x Hence, the holding company trades 
below the sum of valuations of its businesses.  
 In a 1996 study, Henri Servaes documented large diversification discounts 
throughout the 1960s, when the conglomerate merger wave started, but found that these 
disappeared in the 1970s.xi Berger and Ofek also found proof of conglomerate discounts 
for the 1986-1991 period, by comparing the sum of stand-alone values of individual 
business segments, with firm's actual values.xii Furthermore, they identified that the 
difference in values was smaller when activities were closer, same two-digit SIC code2, 
which means that the more diversified the group, bigger the discount applied by the 
market. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 SIC: Standard Industrial Classification - four-digit codes indicating the company's type of business 
 8 
 There are many explanations for conglomerate discounts. First, large 
conglomerates have a tendency for overinvestment and cross-subsidization, that is, 
moving resources of better-performing segments to poorer ones. This argument was 
defended by Berger and Ofekxiii and also in the work of Lamont and Polk.xiv Research 
by Heppelmann and Hoffleith xv  offers another explanation, namely, the holding 
structure itself. They defend that weak management holdings, which fail to strategically 
manage their subsidiaries, are responsible for conglomerate discounts. Another 
justification for this phenomenon is information asymmetry. Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam find that once the shares of a spin-off are traded separately, its individual 
operating efficiency and future prospects are better understood by the market, leading to 
higher valuations.xvi If the market does not understand the business, or does not perceive 
the synergies between the subsidiaries, it will value the conglomerate below its true 
worth. Due to this higher visibility of the business being spun-off, the sum of valuations 
of the separate businesses will be higher than the previous valuation of the 
conglomerate. Other motives for the underperformance of conglomerates are concerned 
with the possibility of empire building and an inefficient decision-making process. 
 Concurrently, spin-offs have the advantage of increasing the focus of both 
demerging companies. Once each company focus on its specific business and the 
decision-making process becomes more effective, there is room for increased 
performance. This performance may further be related with more efficient equity-based 
compensation. Managers of a newly autonomous company will be rewarded based on 
the results of its individual business, not of the whole group, as before. Along the same 
lines, as investors can diversify by themselves, focused companies tend to be preferred, 
achieving, in this manner, higher valuations. Apart from what was mentioned until now, 
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regulatory reasons may also force a company to spin-off a subsidiary. Moreover, a 
parent may want to dispose of a subsidiary due to poor performance or because its 
particular business is no longer appealing to the group. 
 Announcements of spin-offs are generally well received by the market, 
generating positive abnormal returns. From their analysis of 59 cases in the period from 
1963 to 1980, Miles and Rosenfeld concluded that spin-off announcements had a 
positive influence on shareholder wealth, especially in the case of large spin-offs.xvii 
Likewise, Schipper and Smith found positive price reaction following spin-off 
announcements for 93 voluntary spin-offs taking place between 1963 and 1981.xviii 
 Further, spin-offs have a tendency to outperform the market in a one to       
three-year basis. Evidence was found by many authors in various periods such as 
Cusatis, Miles and Woolridge, who detected significantly positive abnormal returns for 
spin-offs and their parent firms over the 1965-1988 periodxix, and Desai and Jain, who 
identified long-run abnormal returns for spin-offs, principally focus-increasing ones, 
between 1975 and 1991. xx  More recent evidence is found when comparing the 
Bloomberg Spin-off Index, a capitalization-weighted index of U.S. spun-off companies, 
with the S&P 500. For the period between 2003 and 2007, the former outperformed the 
market every single year, with a compound annual growth rate of 23% against 11% of 
the S&P 500, as exhibited in Table 1 and Graph 1. Among the reasons for these 
abnormal returns is also the price drop of a spin-off on the first trading day. Since some 
shareholders of the parent are only interested in the main company, they sell the shares 
of the spin-off once they start trading. As spin-offs are, in most cases, specific 
businesses, which were non-core for the parent company, they may not fit their 
investment policy for instance, in terms of industry, geography or beta range. 
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 Other types of divestitures include a sell-off, direct sale of a piece of a company 
to a third party, or an equity carve-out, creation of a new company from a subsidiary 
where a minority interest is sold to the public through an IPO or a trade sale. Although 
the latter involves the creation of a new company, just like a spin-off, this form of 
divestiture provides the parent with a cash infusion and leaves the subsidiary with a 
different stockholder base. The 7 IPOs of Sonae's subsidiaries in 1987 were examples of 
equity carve-outs. From the analysis of a wide number of transactions between 1981 
and 1998, Eric Powers determined that carve-out divisions are more profitable than 
spin-off divisions and that firms choosing a carve-out or a sell-off are often more 
leveraged and, thus, opt for one of these cash-generating divestitures.xxi 
 
The spin-off of Sonae Capital 
 On March 20th, 2007, in the Chairman's Statement of the Report and Accounts 
of 2006, Belmiro de Azevedo announced the intention to spin-off Sonae Capital, in the 
context of "the continuing restructuring of the Sonae Group."xxii  In that opening 
message, which also revealed Paulo Azevedo as the new CEO, it was claimed that the 
spin-off would leave Sonae SGPS more focused on businesses closer to the final 
consumer.xxiii By this time, Sonae Capital had a complex structure, with sub-holdings in 
diverse areas such as Tourism, Engineering, Real estate and Insurance. In the 
subsequent months, this business portfolio would start to be reorganized. 
 The Board of Directors of Sonae SGPS approved, on November 8th, the 
demerger projectxxiv, which foresaw the transfer of its entire shareholding in Sonae 
Capital to a new company at book value, hence without tax implications. In exchange, 
shares of the Sonae Capital would be issued and attributed to Sonae SGPS shareholders, 
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in the proportion of 0.125 shares of Sonae Capital for each share of the parent. This 
leaves the new company with a share capital of €250 million corresponding to 250 
million shares with nominal value of €1. In an extraordinary general meeting of 
shareholders, taking place on December 14th, the demerger project passedxxv and, after 
the registration of the transaction, the admission of the shares to Euronext Lisbon was 
requested.xxvi After a period of separate trading of demerger rights, the listing of Sonae 
Capital will finally take place on January 28th. Sonae Capital was appointed its own 
management team, with Belmiro de Azevedo taking the roles of Chairman and CEO, 
and its shareholder structure expected to be similar to that of Sonae, with Efanor 
Investimentos, owned by Belmiro de Azevedo, as a majority shareholder, Figure 1. 
 The rationale for the operation is essentially, as mentioned, the increased focus 
of Sonae SGPS on businesses closer to the final consumer and, simultaneously, on 
business operations with significant size or an active or intended international 
presence.xxvii At the same time, giving more visibility to Sonae Capital allows for a 
more adequate perception of its value. By spinning-off Sonae Capital and distributing 
its shares to Sonae SGPS shareholders, the transaction will also give liquidity to the 
stock, which is expected to have a considerable free float, and make it subject to the 
rules of the market.xxviii As a result, both companies will be better perceived by the 
market, since whoever wants to invest in the better-known businesses of the group, as 
retail and shopping centres, will hold shares of Sonae SGPS, whereas others intending 
to be exposed to the tourism sector, for instance, will buy shares of Sonae Capital.  
 Another important aspect related with the demerger is that, with a capable 
management team, including Belmiro de Azevedo himself, concentrated only on Sonae 
Capital, its businesses have better chances to flourish than before, while integrated in 
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Sonae SGPS. Finally, taking into account that the portfolio of Sonae Capital includes 
significant holdings of real estate, in a period when it is unclear how the subprime crisis 
in the US will affect the real estate markets elsewhere, the spin-off is an opportunity for 
Sonae SGPS to reduce its exposure. 
 In general, the market reaction to the spin-off was favourable with analysts 
positively evaluating the intentions of the companyxxix (Table 2). The share price of 
Sonae SGPS soared by the combined effect of the announcements of the year results, 
the new CEO and the spin-off. The disclosure of financial information for Sonae 
Capital, some months later, was also well taken by the market.xxx This was the first time 
the market could analyse the financial results of Sonae Capital individually and not just 
the contribution to the results of Sonae SGPS, giving a taste of the transparency that 
will follow the spin-off. The share price performance of Sonae SGPS after the 
announcement is exhibited in Graph 2. 
 As previously mentioned, Sonae SGPS decided to reformulate Sonae Capital's 
business portfolio before the spin-off. Consequently, at this stage, after the acquisition 
and sale of certain assets, Sonae Capital's businesses are divided between Sonae 
Turismo and Spred. The former was created in 1994 and has been a part of Sonae 
Capital since 2006. The aim of this sub-holding is to develop high quality tourism 
resorts and residential buildings, manage real estate assets and provide a series of 
touristic operations.xxxi The other sub-holding, Spred, divides its activities between Seed 
& Venture Capital, Joint Ventures and a portfolio of other investment shareholdings.xxxii  
 Located in the Tróia peninsula and previously owned by Torralta, the 
Troiaresort project is the main endeavour of Sonae Turismo. The Tróia Tourism 
development area is divided in eight Operational Planning and Management Units 
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(UNOPs) and Troiaresort is established in the first four. The project includes real estate 
development, with different types of apartments and villas, three aparthotels under 
refurbishment, a marina and a concession for the river-crossing public transport service 
between Setúbal and Tróia, Atlantic Ferries. The total projected investment for UNOPs 
1-4 amounts to €400 million. In UNOP 3, Sonae Capital has a 75% stake in the 
company managing a golf course currently under improvement works and a 5-star hotel 
resort is also planned. UNOP 5 is owned by Sociedade Imobiliária Tróia B3, in which 
Sonae Capital has a 20% shareholding, whereas UNOPs 7 and 8, Soltróia, constitute a 
real estate development project in the initial planning phase, wholly owned by Sonae 
Capital. Tables 3-6 in the appendix summarize the developments of Tróia and show a 
range of valuations by research analysts for some of them.  
 Outside Tróia, under Sonae Turismo, Sonae Capital operates other touristic 
activities, which include two recently refurbished hotels, Porto Palácio in Oporto and 
Aqualuz in Lagos, Algarve, and Solinca, a network of Health & Fitness Clubs. In 
addition, the company owns other real estate, with projects in the high quality 
residential development and the real estate asset management segments together with a 
stake in Imosede Real Estate Investment Fund. Tables 7 and 8 display data for the two 
hotels owned by Sonae Capital outside Tróia and European hotel market multiples 
respectively, while Table 9 includes information on Solinca Health & Fitness Clubs. An 
independent valuation for the real estate owned by Sonae Capital (except Tróia) was 
performed by Cushman & Wakefieldxxxiii, the results of which are presented in Table 
10. Table 11 contains information regarding Imosede as of December 2007. 
 Under Spred, the main activities relate to Joint Ventures and financial 
investments since, at this time, there are no shareholdings in the Seed & Venture Capital 
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area. The most important Joint Ventures are TP, 50% of the development of 
cogeneration and wind power projects in partnership with the Endesa Group (Table 12); 
Selfrio, 70% in a holding company with shareholdings in the areas of refrigeration and 
air conditioning (recently acquired 35% for €22 millionxxxiv); Box Lines, a shipping 
company focused on the Portuguese islands of Madeira and Azores (Tables 13 and 14); 
and 50% in Choice Car, a company with affiliates in rent-a-car, fleet management and 
car retail. Up until recently, Contacto, a general contract construction company, was 
part of Spred's portfolio, but it was sold earlier this year for €81 millionxxxv, representing 
a net cash inflow of €17.5 million and an estimated capital gain of €47 million.xxxvi The 
relevant minority investments include 50% in Change Partners, a venture capital 
company, 25% in Norscut, owner of a concession of a shadow-toll highway in the North 
of Portugal, and 6.081% in Sonae Indústria. Book values for the shareholdings in 
Choice Car and Change Partners are presented in Table 15, a range of valuations for 
Norscut is given in Table 16, and Table 17 shows the evolution of Sonae Indústria's 
average share price in the last year. Finally, the net debt of Sonae Capital amounts to 
€267 million.xxxvii 
 As it is perceivable, Sonae Capital will be a holding company of a rather 
complicated portfolio of uncorrelated and diversified businesses. If one advantage of 
spin-offs is to reduce the so-called conglomerate discount, in this case, the transaction 
may create an even more complex conglomerate than Sonae SGPS ever was. While the 
on-going reorganization of Sonae Capital's business portfolio, depending on its pace and 
effectiveness, may have an influence, there is the risk that the market applies still a 
greater conglomerate discount to the new company. Therefore, at this point, it is unclear 
how much the company is worth, and how it will be valued by the market. 
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 There are two other risk factors associated with the transaction. First, although 
expected, analyst coverage is not yet guaranteed. The visibility of a spun-off company is 
greatly affected by analyst coverage and so is its stock price. Second, this is a 
particularly difficult time for stock markets worldwide, with the PSI-20 and the S&P 
500 accumulating losses of 18% and 10% respectively, since the end of 2007. 
 
The decision 
 There are various aspects Daniels should consider when deciding whether or not 
to invest in Sonae Capital. First, should he rely on typical spin-off outperformance, 
considering the specific characteristics of the company? How will the market value the 
company, taking into account its complexity? Is it possible that these non-core assets 
have significant hidden value, or are these just the bad businesses that Sonae SGPS did 
not want? Is Tróia a great opportunity or is it a great relief for Sonae SGPS to let it go? 
Is this the right time to be highly exposed to tourism and real estate? Could there be 
good opportunities coming from the seed & venture capital areas? How will the need 
for investment affect the cash flow generation, and when will those cash flows appear? 
Finally, is this a good time for a new company to enter the stock market? 
 In like manner, Steven Daniels must consider the possible investment 
opportunity in the parent company. Are the benefits of the spin-off already incorporated 
in the stock price of Sonae SGPS? If the spin-off really is beneficial for the parent, will 
it be able to keep, or even surpass, its track record of the last twenty years? 
 Finally, shall Daniels buy shares of Sonae Capital once they become listed? 






 This case study has the objective to study the spin-off of Sonae Capital. Students 
should understand the reasons why the company performed this form of divestiture, 
along with the risks associated. A set of proposed questions follows, together with the 





 How much is Sonae Capital worth? Using the available data, perform a 
valuation of the company, indicating a target price per share. 
 Given the lack of information and the diversified nature of Sonae Capital's 
portfolio, a sum of parts valuation was performed, with several assumptions. Some of 
the businesses were valued using simplifying methods and some shareholdings were 
ignored due to their minor importance and small impact in the total value of the 
company. It is worth mentioning as well that the insurance brokerage business was held 
by a subsidiary of Sonae Capital, but was acquired by Sonae SGPS for an undisclosed 
value and so, was also not taken into account. 
 Starting with Tróia's real estate, from the data provided by the company on the 
Promissory Purchase Agreements (Table 4), it was observable that the average sale 
prices per square meter of the apartments and villa plots were approximately €4,000 and 
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€3,000 respectively. These were used as the sale prices for the remaining apartments 
and villas for sale. Additionally, since none of the developments was completely sold 
and they faced different development stages, distinct maturity discounts were applied. 
These relate also to the possible contamination effect that the real estate crisis in the US 
could have in Portugal. The valuation of Tróia's Real estate is disclosed in Table 18, in 
the Appendix II. 
 For two of the hotel units of the group, Aqualuz Lagos and Porto Palácio, 
revenue data was provided in Table 7. Knowing that the aparthotels in Tróia would 
together have 1,100 beds, the number of rooms was assumed to be 380, by comparison 
with the ratio of beds/room of Aqualuz Lagos. The revenue per available room 
(RevPAR) for Aqualuz was assumed to be €60, the value implied by the turnover of the 
third quarter of 2007, since, although these three months represent the high season, this 
was also the first quarter after the refurbishment works. Seeing that the units in Tróia 
would be aparthotels as well, RevPAR was expected to be similar. Here it was assumed 
to be €70, attributing a small premium to the unique location of Tróia. For Porto 
Palácio, as the implied RevPAR of almost €128 seemed to be hard to sustain, a 
RevPAR of €100 was assumed. From the European Market Multiples shown in Table 8 
an EV/Sales multiple of 3x was assumed and maturity discounts were also applied 
owing to the construction works still in progress in the Tróia units and the recent 
refurbishments of the other two developments. The valuation for the hotels is exhibited 
in Table 19 in the Appendix II. 
 As a consequence of the lack of data and the fact that none of them were 
finished and operating, the other Tróia developments were valued using simplifying 
methods. Consequently, the operation of Atlantic Ferries was attributed the value of the 
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tangible assets in progress of the ferry boats, the marina was valued at the tangible asset 
in progress as well, whereas the stakes in the other UNOPs (Golf, hotel resort, Tróia B3 
and Soltróia) were valued at the minimum of the range of valuations by research 
analysts presented in Table 6. The total valuation of Tróia was obtained by summing 
each of the described projects and subtracting the projected future investment of €400 
million. The result is shown in Table 20 in the Appendix II. 
 For the remaining touristic operation outside Tróia, Solinca Health & Fitness 
Clubs, the released results for the first six and nine months of 2007 and a range of 
EV/EBITDA multiples used by research analysts were supplied in Table 9. The 
EBITDA of September 2007 was considered to be the full-year one for a matter of 
conservativeness, and the EV/EBITDA assumed to be 8x. The final value is given in 
Table 21 in the Appendix II. 
 Sonae Capital also owned other real estate, either directly or through its stake in 
Imosede Real Estate Investment Fund. For the former, the Cushman & Wakefield 
calculated market value was used (Table 10), including only 20% of the opinion of 
value in order to be conservative and in light of the potential impact the real estate crisis 
in the US could have in the Portuguese market. As for the stake in Imosede, Sonae 
Capital's share of the Net Asset Value of the fund was considered. 
 Under Spred, the 70% stake in Selfrio was valued at €44 million, since 35% had 
been recently acquired for €22 million. For Box Lines, the EBITDA for the full year 
2007 was projected from the results disclosed by the company (Table 13) and an 
EV/EBITDA of 7.5x was used, in line with maritime transport market multiples (Table 
14). Box lines valuation can be observed in Table 22 in the Appendix II. Norscut was 
valued by the minimum of the range of valuations, presented in Table 16, while the 
 19 
shareholdings in Change Partners and Choice Car were valued at their respective book 
values displayed in Table 15. TP, the JV responsible for the electricity developments, 
had three projects operating at that time, two of wind power and one of cogeneration, 
plus another one for future production, ENEOP. These projects were valued using the 
middle point of the EV/MW range of multiples by research analysts, noting that the one 
for ENEOP already includes the necessary investment. To the latter, a maturity discount 
was also applied, as perceivable in Table 23 in the Appendix II. 
 Finally, the 6.081% shareholding in Sonae Indústria had to be taken into 
account. As it is observable in Table 17, the average share price of Sonae Indústria 
decreases as we narrow our observation period, depicting a decreasing trend in the stock 
price. For a matter of conservativeness and considering the performance of stock 
markets worldwide in late 2007 and early 2008, the one-week average share price was 
used. These calculations are visible in Table 24 in the Appendix II. 
 After summing the values of each business composing Sonae Capital, the total 
Enterprise Value is attained. To get the total value of Equity two other adjustments have 
to be made. First, the sale of Contacto has to be accounted for. Since the total 
consideration to be paid to Sonae Capital was not certain at the time of the case and 
would depend on the amount of cash and equivalents in the company, the value 
attributed was the capital gain estimated from the transaction, €47 million. In addition, 
the value of Net Debt had to be subtracted. This was estimated to be €267 million, 
already adjusted for the sale of Contacto. Applying a 20% holding discount and 
considering the 250 million shares outstanding, a price per share of €1.58 was reached. 
The total valuation for Sonae Capital is revealed in Table 25 in the Appendix II. 
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 What are the positive and the negative aspects of the spin-off for both the parent 
and the new company? Is this a good deal for both? Which company is better/worse 
off? 
 There are several aspects surrounding this transaction that deserve to be 
analysed in the perspective of both the parent and the spun-off company. Starting with 
the increased focus, one of the reasons given by Sonae to support the decision to 
undertake the spin-off and a common benefit of this type of divestiture. While 
conglomerates have a tendency to move resources from better to worse preforming 
segments3, as previously mentioned, with the spin-off, Sonae SGPS would be able to 
focus solely on its core businesses as retail and shopping centres. At the same time, 
Sonae Capital would be able to focus on its own projects, both the current and the 
prospective ones. A fully dedicated management team, including Belmiro de Azevedo, 
should also be more capable of continuing the revision of the business portfolio, 
turnaround the low-performing segments and identify new business opportunities. 
 Taking into account that, in spite of the demerger, the two companies would 
continue to have close relationships, the Chairman for example would be the same, it 
was foreseeable that they would be privileged trading partners to one another. Thus, 
despite autonomous, either of them could be a favourable supplier/client to the other, 
which may have been an advantage, in particular for the newly independent Sonae 
Capital. 
 At this time, Sonae Capital was a holding company, not directly engaged in any 
operation and, for that reason, dependent on the cash flows generated by its affiliates. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Lamont, Owen A., and Christopher Polk. 2002. "Does diversification destroy value? Evidence from the 
industry shocks." Journal of Financial Economics, 63(1): 51-77. 
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Since the segments integrated under Sonae Capital were the ones Sonae SGPS 
considered to be non-core, there was the risk the new company was only getting the 
"bad" businesses of the group. Furthermore, as some of these businesses had shown 
poor results in recent times, and others were still in need for substantial investment in 
construction and refurbishment works, their cash flow generation was unpredictable.  
 A significant share of Sonae Capital's business was devoted to tourism and real 
estate, sectors highly correlated with the evolution of the economy and consumer 
confidence. In spite of the focus in the high-end markets of touristic resorts and second 
home, the timing of the spin-off was an unusually risky one to have this exposure, with 
the subprime crisis in the US threatening to contaminate the global real estate market. 
The main example was Tróia, despite the great opportunity, even opening the door for 
similar projects to be developed elsewhere, this might not have been the correct time to 
be so dependent on it. That said, it seems more beneficial for Sonae SGPS to have 
reduced its exposure to real estate and tourism than it was for Sonae Capital to have it. 
 An independent Sonae Capital would be more capable of pursuing new business 
opportunities, mainly through its Seed & Venture Capital division. However, whilst 
good opportunities may in fact have existed, Sonae Capital would still face the first 
mover risk. Although the autonomous condition was preferable to take advantage of 
new opportunities, the prevailing circumstances of the company may not have been the 
desired ones. With great investment to be made and not many stable cash flow 
generating businesses, the company was in a difficult position to enter new and 
uncorrelated ventures. 
 One of the focal points of the spin-off concerns the way the market would 
perceive and value Sonae Capital. The transaction would give visibility to the new 
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company, which could be better understood by the market. In general, as mentioned 
before, the separate trading of shares leads to higher valuations, as the market 
understands the new company better.4 The separate trading of the shares of both 
companies makes their investment identity clearer, allowing investors to adapt 
according to their preferences. Thus, many investors drop the shares of the spin-off 
company on the first trading day, leaving these shares trading at discount and hence 
creating a good investment opportunity. Moreover, as already discussed, spin-offs have 
a tendency to outperform the market5, in part as a result of this first day drop in price. 
 The way the market would perceive the new company could, likewise, benefit 
from analyst coverage, albeit not certain before the listing, and the presence of Belmiro 
de Azevedo in the management team. Not only would Sonae Capital profit from his 
leadership and devotion to the management of the company, but also from his 
reputation. Belmiro de Azevedo's capabilities were widely recognised, and his 
appointment as Chairman and CEO could send a strong signal to the market. 
 Conversely, the spin-off by itself may not have been enough for the market to 
perfectly understand the company. The challenges faced by the market to value Sonae 
Capital as a subsidiary of Sonae SGPS would still be encountered once it became 
autonomous. Unlike most spin-offs, the new company would not be concentrated on a 
specific sector. On the opposite, Sonae Capital would have a complex structure of 
diversified and uncorrelated businesses. Even with more information disclosed, there 
was nonetheless a strong risk that some of the smaller subsidiaries were attributed a 
value of zero. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Krishnaswami, Sudha, and Venkat Subramaniam. 1999. "Information asymmetry, valuation, and the 
corporate spin-off decision." Journal of Financial Economics, 53(1): 73-112. 
5 Cusatis, P.J., J.A. Miles and J.R. Woolridge. 1993. "Restructuring Through Spin-Off: The Stock Market 
Evidence." Journal of Financial Economics, 33: 293-311. 
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 By the same token, for the market to react positively to the listing, it would have 
to believe there was some hidden value to be unlocked by the spin-off. If the former     
non-core assets of Sonae SGPS did have some hidden value, the market would 
eventually recognise it, yet, if the market perceived them as only the low-performing 
businesses that Sonae did not want, the reaction would be unfavourable. 
 There are other factors that could undermine the usual spin-off outperformance. 
First, one should note that Sonae Capital was to be listed in the Portuguese Stock 
Market, not an example of development and liquidity, and therefore may not have 
followed the typical performance pattern of spin-offs in other markets. Second, the 
market timing could prove disastrous. With the already mentioned market conditions, 
once investors of the parent, not interested in the spin-off, disposed of their shares, there 
was a high risk of demand shortage. 
 In the end, at the time of the spin-off, Sonae Capital was in fact a more complex 
conglomerate than Sonae SGPS had previously been. Whilst Sonae SGPS had specific 
core businesses and a variety of smaller ones, Sonae Capital was to be formed 
exclusively by these small companies, which, for the most part, did not have synergies 
among them. As mentioned before, there is evidence that conglomerate discounts tend 
to be bigger, the more diversified a company is.6 In this manner, Sonae Capital would 
still be a conglomerate, but without the common advantages, that is, with no stable cash 
flow generating businesses to sustain the new growth opportunities. The great risk of 
this spin-off was therefore, in my opinion, that the reduction of the conglomerate 
discount of Sonae SGPS would come at the expense of an even greater conglomerate 
discount of Sonae Capital.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Berger, Philp G., and Eli Ofek. 1995. "Diversification's effect on firm value." Journal of Financial 
Economics, 37(1): 39-65. 
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 The reorganization process of the new company, which was still in progress at 
the time of the case, could have played a decisive role. The revision of the portfolio of 
Sonae Capital could have made it less confuse and more focused, while, concurrently, 
having a positive impact in the financial results of the company. The success of this 
process would depend on what businesses were eventually sold, and at what price. The 
prevailing state of the market may not have been the desired one to get the best deals in 
the alienation of some of these businesses, which makes it further unlikely that the 
reformulation would substantially reduce the conglomerate discount of Sonae Capital. 
 Summing up, in my opinion, the spin-off would be more advantageous for 
Sonae SGPS. This divestiture would not be as satisfying for Sonae Capital and would 
not be as positive as spin-offs tend to be. Nevertheless, the main benefit for the new 
company should have been the fully dedicated management team, which would include 
Belmiro de Azevedo. Overall, albeit not perfect, the spin-off may still have left Sonae 
Capital better off, if the reorganization of the business portfolio turned out to be 
effective and the current and prospective projects delivered on their expectations.  
 
Should Steven Daniels invest in Sonae SGPS and/or Sonae Capital? What kind of 
trading strategy should he follow?  
 Ordinarily, the price of a spin-off drops in its first trading day, since, as already 
mentioned, many shareholders of the parent are not interested in the new company. 
With this in mind, and considering the price reached of €1.58 per share, a possible 
trading strategy would be to buy shares of Sonae Capital at the end of the first day, if 
the price dropped below this threshold. However, Sonae Capital did not seem like a 
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typical spin-off, which tends to outperform the market in a one to three-year basis. 
Unlike most spin-offs, which are specific businesses, Sonae Capital would control a 
complex portfolio of diversified and uncorrelated shareholdings. Considering the 
specificity of its business portfolio, the exposure to real estate and the market timing, 
the outlook for Sonae Capital was not as bright as that of other spin-offs. That said, a 
long-term strategy of buy and hold was not advised. Instead, Daniels should have sold 
his position not long after, once the price surpassed his threshold and yielded him an 
adequate return. 
 Conversely, taking into account Sonae Group's track record of market 
outperformance and the benefits of the spin-off for the parent company, Daniels should 
have taken a long position on Sonae SGPS. Even if these benefits were already partially 
incorporated in the stock price, there was no reason to believe that Sonae would not 
continue to outperform the market, after a transaction that left the company better off. 
 
What Happened 
 January 3rd, 2008 was the last day Sonae SGPS shares entitled its owners to 
demerger rights, which could be traded or eventually converted into shares of Sonae 
Capital. The stock closed at 1.91€ and, in the following day, this price was adjusted 
according to the 0.125 factor. This implied, at this point, a theoretical price of €1.91 for 
Sonae Capital, equal to the parent's. Before the period of trading of demerger rights, 
analysts valued them above that adjustment, at around €0.377, implying a theoretical 
price per share of €2.29 for Sonae Capital. Against these predictions, the rights opened 
at €0.23 on January 9th and would close at €0.21 on January 15th, suggesting a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Jornal de Negócios (January 9th, 2008) 
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theoretical price of €1.68. When Sonae Capital finally arrived to the market, on January 
28th, it would open at €1.57 and close at €1.44. Although analysts had mentioned the 
state of the market and the holding nature of the company as potentially damaging to the 
performance of the stock8, the market reaction to the listing was worse than they had 
predicted. Notwithstanding, the price recovered in the following days and Investment 
Banks were still optimistic on the potential for appreciation, as perceptible from the 
price targets shown in Table 26 in the Appendix II. 
 It is important to assess how the spin-off affected the welfare of an investor who 
owned shares of Sonae SGPS and opted to keep the demerger rights until they were 
converted into shares of Sonae Capital. For a matter of simplicity, since for every eight 
shares of Sonae SGPS held, an investor received one share of Sonae Capital, let us 
compare the value of the portfolio of an investor who owns precisely eight shares of the 
former, still including demerger rights, that is, before January 3rd, with the final value 
after the spin-off, when the portfolio was composed by eight shares of Sonae SGPS and 
one share of Sonae Capital. Graph 3 and Table 27 in the Appendix II show that the 
value of this imaginary portfolio dropped during this period. From this analysis, it is 
clear that value is destroyed and this particular investor is worse off after the 
transaction. 
 As a note of caution, the state of the stock market must be taken into account. 
Nevertheless, if the period from one month before the last day Sonae SGPS shares 
traded with demerger rights to one month after the spin-off is analysed (December 3rd to 
February 28th), data shows that Sonae SGPS had a negative return of 40%, against a loss 
of 15% by the PSI-20. If the analysis is focused only on the period after the end of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Ibid. 
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demerger rights (January 3rd), Sonae still has a greater loss than the index, -25% against 
-12%. What is more, one month after the spin-off, the shares of Sonae Capital were 
trading 1.3% below the opening price, 7.74% below the price implied by the trading of 
demerger rights and more than 18% below the price implied by the adjustment of Sonae 
SGPS shares to the detachment of demerger rights. From this, it is concluded that the 
decreasing value of the imaginary portfolio is not only the result of the stock market 
timing, since both companies underperformed the Portuguese Stock Index (Graph 4 
and Graph 5, Appendix II).  
 Another relevant examination is on the attractiveness of Sonae Capital as an 
investment for someone who did not own shares of Sonae SGPS. To that aim, a further 
analysis on the stock price evolution is due. Spin-offs frequently provide good 
investment opportunities since their price drops on the first trading day and they 
normally outperform the market on a one to three-year basis. In the case of the spin-off 
of Sonae Indústria, if the low point in the week after the listing is considered, the 
company only beat the market on a one-year basis, failing to do it if we extend the 
horizon. The demerged company, Sonae SGPS, outperformed the PSI-20 both on a one 
and a two-year basis (Graph 6 in the Appendix II). When the more recent case is 
examined, data shows that regardless of the horizon, both the parent and the spin-off 
underperform the market, as evident in Table 28 and Graph 7 in the Appendix II.  
 To conclude, irrespectively of the state of the market, one certainly cannot 
consider the spin-off a success by its stock market performance. Moreover, this spin-off 
did not provide a good investment opportunity for someone who bought the shares after 
the first trading day and held on to them for the following years, in contradiction with 
evidence from most spin-offs. 
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 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 TOTAL CAGR 
BNSPIN 42% 26% 7% 19% 15% 180% 23% 
S&P 500 26% 9% 4% 12% 4% 67% 11% 
Source: Casewriter. Data from Bloomberg 
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"(...) it will contribute to give visibility to the only company of Sonae 
which is still difficult to value" BPI 
"The spin-off (...) will reduce the holding discount and increase the 
value of Sonae Capital, especially due to the development of the Tróia 
Resort (...) which, we believe, contains a significant hidden value" 
 
"We hope Sonae Capital becomes more transparent with the 
demerger, currently it is valued by its book value" 
UBS 
"The hottest announcement of the disclosure of Sonae SGPS results 
was the spin-off of Sonae Capital (...) the less visible asset of the 
group. In our opinion this should have a hidden value" 
Caixa BI 
 
"The intention to spin-off Sonae Capital has developed interest among 
institutional investors and was well received by analysts, as it may 
reveal some hidden value of the company" 
Reuters 
 
Source: Casewriter. Data from Bloomberg 
	  
Source: Adapted from opinions expressed in news articles in the days after the 
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Table 4 - Troiaresort Promotion as of 28 November 2007 
 
 
Table 5 - Other Tróia Developments 
 
Development Approx. Area (m2) # Location 
Beach Apartments 28 000 211 UNOP 1 
Central Building 13 000 71 UNOP 1 
Marina Apartments 6 750 78 UNOP 1 
Caldeira Apartments 47 000 275 UNOP 1 
Total apartment area 94 750 
Beach and Golf residential villas 33 000 96 UNOP 2 
Troia Village residential villas 14 000 90 UNOP 2 
Eco-Resort villas 21 700 120 UNOP 4 
Total area of villas 68 700 




Beach Apartments  211 132.7 4014 
Promissory Purchase Agreements  83 125.6 3983 
Apartments for sale  128 137.3 4033 
Marina Apartments  78 84.6 4086 
Promissory Purchase Agreements  47 84 3833 
Apartments for sale  31 85.4 4464 
Golf and Beach Villa Plots  96 343.8 3047 
Promissory Purchase Agreements 12 343.8 3467 




Central Building Apartments Construction will finish in 2008; not yet up for sale. 
Caldeira Apartments Construction not yet started.  
Tróia Village residential villas  Construction started in 4Q07 
Eco-Resort Villas  Not yet approved 
 
Location  Description 
3 Aparthotels UNOP 1-2 
Tróia Mar, Tróia Rio and Tróia Sado; 1100 
beds in total 
Atlantic Ferries UNOP 1 Valued at 16.97M€ 
Marina UNOP 1 Valued at 4.71M€ 
Golf UNOP 3 18 hole golf course, reopening March 2008 
Hotel Resort UNOP 3 Scheduled to build a 5-star hotel 
Tróia B3 UNOP 5 20% share of Sonae Capital 
Soltróia UNOP 7-9 Fully owned by Sonae Capital 
Source: Company data 
Source: Company data 
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Table 7 - Hotel data 
 
 
















Table 9 - Solinca Health & Fitness Clubs 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Revenue per available room - RevPAR = ADR (Average daily room rate) * occupancy rate 
2 Turnover for the first 9 months of 2007 
3 Turnover for the third quarter 2007	  
M€ Min Max Avg 
Golf 2.50 8 4.38 
Hotel Resort 13 60 31.33 
Tróia B3 2 13.5 7.47 
Soltróia 63 95.1 73.23 
Unit Beds Rooms Turnover Days Implied RevPAR1 
Porto Palácio  251 8.8
2 273 128.42 
Aqualuz Lagos 467 163 0.93 92 60.02 
 
EV/sales 
M€ 2006 2007 
Accor S.A. 2.13 1.70 
Casino De Cannes 2.56 3.55 
Hotel Regina Par 4.76 5.63 
Intercontinental 5.46 2.76 
Jolly Hotels 3.17 2.86 
Millennium & Cop 3.89 1.97 
Hotel Majestic 3.24 3.95 
NH Hoteles S.A. 2.68 2.08 
Geke S.A. 3.18 3.78 
Sol Melia S.A. 3.24 1.92 
Average 3.43 3.02 








Turnover (M€) 8.5 12.5 
Members 29 000 EBITDA (M€) 2 3 
EV/EBITDA range of 
values 7.5x - 9x 
EBITDA 
margin 24% 24% 
Source: Company data; Adapted from equity research reports from Santander, BPI, UBS, Caixa BI, Millenium Investment 
Banking and Banif Investment Bank issued between January and March 2008 
Source: Adapted from equity research reports from Santander, BPI, UBS, Caixa BI, Millenium Investment Banking and Banif 
Investment Bank issued between January and March 2008 
Source: Company data 
Source: Casewriter. Data from Damodaran Online, http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/ (Accessed October 2, 2014) 
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4 Future project. EV/MW range of values already include the necessary investment 
 
Value (M€) Area (m2) 
Land 5.89 7 308 975 
Projects 179.83 592 600 
Under development 117.17 366 812 
For sale 62.66 225 788 







Total Market Value 196.53 
Opinion of Worth 15.19 
Total  211.72 
Sonae Capital's stake 57.84% 
Total Value € 92 390 490 
Net Asset Value € 87 766 365 
Ner of Participation Units 149 221 
Value of Participation Unit € 588.16 
 
Stake MW EV/MW range of values 
Wind Power  
Serra Capucha 50% 10 0.8x - 1.75x 
Serra Sicó 52% 20 0.8x - 1.75x 
ENEOP4 20% 1200 0.2x - 0.45x 
Cogeneration 100% 70 0.6x - 1.8x 
M€ Sep 2007 
EBITDA 1.1 
Turnover 34.7 
EBITDA margin 3.17% 
Source: Property Valuation of the Resorts and Residential Development and Asset Management (excluding Tróia) 
businesses of Sonae Capital - Cushman & Wakefield, 30th September 2007 
Source: Company data; Adapted from equity research reports from Santander, BPI, UBS, Caixa BI, Millenium Investment 
Banking and Banif Investment Bank issued between January and March 2008 
Source: Company data; Report and Accounts 2007 Imosede Real Estate Investment Fund  
Source: Company data 
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Table 15 - Book Values of shareholdings                     Table 16 - Range of valuations 





















A P Moller - Ma 6.00 5.65 
Borgestad Asa 9.67 11.17 
Clarkson Plc 5.01 7.30 
Cmb Cie Maritime 6.23 10.39 
Dfds A/S 11.29 9.05 
Euronav SA 6.40 5.38 
Exmar NV 11.22 9.58 
Farstad Shipping 10.23 9.57 
Geodis 7.96 4.94 
Havila Shipping 8.91 4.71 
Navigazione Mont 5.87 5.41 
Premuda Spa 5.01 7.40 
Rederi Ab Transa 6.00 4.93 
Saga 4.82 9.10 
Sloman Neptun 9.55 8.09 
Smit Intl NV 11.15 10.05 
Touax 10.12 9.58 
Wilson Asa 5.04 6.40 
Average 7.80 7.71 
Median 7.18 7.75 
M€ 
 Min Valuation 18 
Max Valuation 58.8 
Average Valuation 40.76 
M€ 
BV of the 
shareholding 
Choice Car 2.11 
Change Partners 2.07 
Shareholding 6.801% 
 
Total ner of shares 140 000 000 
 
 1 week 1 month 3 months 6 months 1 year 
Average share 
price 4.47€ 5.40€ 6.91€ 8.00€ 8.81€ 
Source: Casewritter. SONI.LS data from Yahoo Finance, http://finance.yahoo.com/ (accessed October 2, 2014) 
Source: Casewriter. Data from Damodaran Online, http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/ (Accessed October 2, 2014) 
 
Source: Adapted from equity research reports 
from Santander, BPI, UBS, Caixa BI, Millenium 
Investment Banking and Banif Investment Bank 
issued between January and March 2008 




Table 18 - Tróia's Real Estate Valuation 
 
Table 19 - Hotel Valuation 
 
 














Tróia Real Estate 








Beach Apartments  211 133 4014 10% 101.38 
Central Building  71 183 4000 15% 44.18 
Marina Apartments  78 87 4086 10% 24.95 
Caldeira Apartments  275 171 4000 25% 141.08 
Beach and Golf residential villas  96 344 3047 10% 90.56 
Troia Village residential villas  90 156 3000 25% 31.59 
Eco-Resort villas  120 181 3000 30% 45.61 
Total  479.35 
Unit Beds Rooms Days RevPAR Turnover (M€) EV/Sales 
Maturity 
Discount 
EV           
(M€) 
Tróia 1100 380 365 70 9.71 3x 20% 23.30 
Porto 
Palácio  251 365 100 9.16 3x 15% 23.36 
Aqualuz 467 163 365 60 3.57 3x 15% 9.10 
M€ 






UNOP 1-4 126.83 
UNOP 3 13 
UNOP 5 2 









EV (M€) 24 
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M€ Sep 07 Dec 07P 
EBITDA 1.1 1.47 
Turnover 34.7 46.27 
EBITDA margin 3.17%  
EV/EBITDA  7.5x 
Implied EV  11.00 
 
Stake MW EV/MW Discount EV (M€) 
Wind Power           
Serra Capucha 50% 10 1.275  6.38 
Serra Sicó 52% 20 1.275  13.26 
ENEOP 20% 1200 0.325 20% 62.4 
Cogeneration 100% 70 1.2  84 
Total      166.04 
SC's stake 50%       83.02 
M€ 
 Tróia 204.83 
Other Touristic Operations 56.46 
Other Real Estate 199.57 
Norscut 18 
Imosede  50.76 
Selfrio 44 
TP 83.02 
Box Lines 11 
Sonae Indústria 42.56 
Others 4.17 
Total EV 714.38 
Net Debt - 267 
Contacto gain 47 
Equity Value 494.38 
Holding Discount 20% 
Number of shares 250 Mn 
Price per share 1.58€ 
Shareholding 6.801% 
Total ner of shares 140 Mn 
1-week average 
price 4.47€ 
Total value (M€) 625.8 
SC's share (M€) 42.6 
 9 
































Santander European Equity 
Research € 3.00 28/01/08 
BPI Equity Research € 2.50 01/02/08 
UBS Investment Research € 2.20 08/02/08 
Caixa BI € 2.50 18/02/08 
Millenium Investment Banking € 2.35 04/03/08 
Banif Investment Bank € 1.95 27/03/08 
Source: Adapted from equity research reports from Santander, BPI, UBS, Caixa BI, 
Millenium Investment Banking and Banif Investment Bank issued between January and 
March 2008 
 € -    
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Sonae's shares entitle 






1 share Sonae Capital 
8 demerger rights 
8 shares Sonae 
Source: Casewriter. Data from Bloomberg 
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 Date Total Value of the Portfolio 
03/12/07 € 16.40 
17/12/07 € 15.76 
24/12/07 € 15.44 
Detachment of 
demerger rights from 
Sonae SGPS shares 
03/01/08 € 15.28 
Demerger rights start 
trading 09/01/08 € 13.28 
Demerger rights end 
trading 15/01/08 € 12.16 
Spin-off 28/01/08 € 11.60 
 01/02/08 € 11.89 
08/02/08 € 11.69 
27/02/08 € 11.39 









SON PSI 20 
Source: Casewriter. Data from Bloomberg 
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Graph 6 - Share price performance after the spin-off of Sonae Indústria 
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Graph 7 - Share price performance after the spin-off of Sonae Capital 
 











 1y 2y 3y 
SONC -68% -49% -71% 
SON -62% -30% -37% 
PSI-20 -42% -28% -30% 
Source: Casewriter. Data from Bloomberg 
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